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Abstract - This paper explores the effect of an industrial policy in an open
economy. We present a two-country, two-good, two-factor general equilibrium
model of intra-industry trade, in which one good is in monopolistic competition.
We analyze the effect of structural regulation when a country regulates the
number.of companies in the monopolistic competitive sector in its country. This
policy increases the utility level of the country in an open economy. We also
show that in some conditions, such an industrial policy increases the utility
level of the foreign country. Furthermore, if the factor endowment ratio of two
countries is the same, the policy always increases the utility levels of both
countries.
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INTRODUCTION
Dixit=Stiglitz (1977) presented a general equilibrium model ofmonopolistic
competition. The utility function of this model is called a love-of-variety type,
where the more varieties we consume, the higher the utility level. In this model,
if the government regulates to expand the output of one company, the price of
the company's product becomes cheaper due to economies of scale. If the
government regulates to expand the number of companies, the product varieties
become larger. As a result, Dixit=Stiglitz (1977) showed that the utility level
when the government regulates is higher than that of the market equilibrium.
In other words, this model explains the significance of an industrial policy, with
a production function under economies of scale and a utility function of a love-
of-variety type,.
Krugman (1979), Lawrence=Spiller (1983), and Helpman=Krugman (1985)
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have presented intra-industry trade models based .on Dixit=Stiglitz (1977).
Venables (1982), Flam=Helpman(1987), Gros (1987), Venables (1987), and
Helpman=Krugman(1989) analyzed the impact of tariffs and production
subsidies on the models. The result of their research was that a tariff increased
the utility level of the home country and decreased that of the foreign country.
On the other hand, with a model under economies of scale and the utility
function of a love-of-variety type, Koenker=Perry (1981) and Horn (1984)
analyzed the impact of an industrial policy. Koenker=Perry (1981) presented a
one-product (differentiated good), one-factor general equilibrium model. Horn
(1984) presented a two-product (differentiated good and homogeneous good),
one-factor general equilibrium model. They compared the market equilibrium
with three optima, that is, the unconstrained optimum and two constrained
optima. The unconstrained optimum is the optimum in which the government
regulates both the number of companies and the output of one company in the
monopolistic competitive sector. Two constrained optima are the optima in
which the government regulates either the number of companies or the output
of one company in the monopolistic competitive sector. The policy of regulating
the output of one company is called behavioral regulation, and the policy of
regulating the number of companies is called structural regulation.
Koenker=Perry (1981) and Horn (1984) showed that the constrained optima of
structural regulation is always better than the market equilibrium.
Lawrence=Spiller (1983) presented a two-country, two-product
(differentiated good and homogeneous good), and two-factor general equilibrium
model of intra-industry trade. The model explored the market equilibrium and
the unconstrained optimum, but it didn't show constrained optima.
Therefore, we first explore the constrained optima of structural regulation of
Lawrence=Spiller's closed economy model, and compare it with the market
equilibrium.
Our analysis shows that when a government undertakes structural
regulation, the utility level is always higher than that of the market
equilibrium. This means that if two countries, which trade each other and have
similar production technology and consumption pattern,. cooperate by adopting
the same industrial policy, both countries increase their utility levels.
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Actually, it is unrealistic to suppose that two countries that engage in trade
(or, all countries with mutual trade) will cooperate in structural regulation.
Rather we should attend to the industrial policy of one country in an open
economy. It is often observed that a country undertakes structural regulation by
some barriers or regulations in an open economy.
In this paper, we suppose a country undertakes structural regulation in an
open economy, and we explore the policy's effect on the utility levels of the home
country and the foreign country. Our analysis shows if two countries have
similar factor endowment ratios, structural regulation in one country increases
the utility levels of both countries. Moreover, if the factor endowment ratios of
two countries are the same, the policy always increases the utility levels of both
countries.
As stated above, a tariff benefits the home country at the cost of the foreign
country. Thus, the policy's effect is largely different from the tariffs effect. In
other words, our conclusion means that if two countries trade each other and
have similar property in technology, consumption pattern and factor
endowment ratio, structural regulation, whether done by a country or two
countries together, benefits both the home country and the foreign country.
In the second section in this paper, we explain Lawrence=Spiller's closed
economy model and its market equilibrium. In the third section, we explore the
constrained optima of structural regulation in this model. In the fourth section,
we use the model to compare the constrained optima with the market
equilibrium, and analyze the effect of structural regulation. In the fifth section,
we explain Lawrence=Spiller's open economy model and its market equilibrium.
In the sixth section, we explore the constrained optima of structural regulation
of this model. In the seventh section, we use the model to analyze the structural
regulation's effect on the foreign country. The last section is our conclusion.
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM IN A CLOSED ECONOMY
In this section, we explain the closed economy model of Lawrence=SpiUer
(1983).
Consider an economy composed of identical consumers whose preferences
can be characterized by a utility function,
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0< B, s s 1.(2.1)
Y = K & L 1-& 0 < 8 < 1,y y ,
where K y is the capital input and Ly the labor input in the Y industry. We
consider this good as a numeraire, and assume its price as 1.
The cost function for any Xi is
(2.3) rei = ry + WflXl' i = 1,···,n,
where y is the capital setup cost, r the rental cost, w the wage rate. Hence
the production function of a company is Xi = Li / f3 ,where Li is the labor input.




U 0= Yl-S(~X/ y,
Y is a homogeneous commodity produced in a competitive market. The Xi'S are
of a heterogeneous quality. There are n number of differentiated goods. B is a
constant, and () = (0- -1)/0-, where (y is the elasticity of substitution between
Xi and Xl' j*i.
The production function of the competitive sector is assumed to be a Cobb-
Douglas function,
(2.2)
where L is the stock of labor and K is the stock of capital in the economy.
The first-order condition for utility maximization is
(2.4) P; =-1s YX;O-I/t X /,
-s ;=1
where P; is the prIce of a differentiated product. The utility function, the
production function and the cost function imply symmetrical solutions of the
outputs ·of companies and their prices in the monopolistic competitive sector.
Therefore, if the outputs of each company are the same, the price is
s 1(2.4a) P =-Y-.
l-s Xn
If the number of companies is sufficiently large, the condition for profit
maximization for companies is
(2.5) PlJ =wj3.
The zero profit condition for companiesis
(2.6) PX = ry + wf3X.
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In the sector of constant returns to scale, the condition for profit
maximization is
(2.7), (2.8) wLy = (1- e)Y, rKy = eY .
The endowment constraints in the economy are
(2.9), (2.10) L =Ly + nLx, K = Ky + nr .
By solving these equations, the number of companies in the monopolistic











m kfJ (1- B)(l - z) ,
Ym=k'L o(1-s{:JG=:fe,
where Z= (l-s)e+ s(1- B).
Using (2.1) and (2.11)-(2.13), we obtain the utility level U m •
STRUCTURAL REGUlATION IN A CLOSED ECONOMY
The market equilibrium is the equilibrium of free-entry and zero profit.
However, we now suppose that the government has a strong authority and a
wise administration. That is, a government is a planner who can regulate the
number of companies in the monopolistic competitive sector. Besides, as a result
of the regulation, if the companies are in a deficit, the planner gives them a
subsidy to cover the deficit so that the companies can produce even in a deficit.
This means that the government can transfer income from households (workers
and owners of capital) to companies through taxes and subsidies. In this policy,
when the highest utility level is achieved, it is a constrained social optimum. We
call this the constrained optimum.
When such a regulation is put into action, each company acts on profit
maximization as "marginal revenue equals marginal cost". As a result, if
companies are in a deficit, the government transfers income to cover the deficit.
The planner decides the number of companies in the monopolistic
competitive sector as nn. Then, solving (2.2), (2.4a), (2.5) and (2.7)-(2.10), we
express the output of one company and homogeneous product, X n and J:, as
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x = .sB L
n fifJ. -(1-s)8-s(1-B)}nn '
J: = (K -nnytG ~(iI~siJ~-;L 8) LJ 1-'.
Optimum nn is the solution of the following calculation
s
max U= J:l-S(nn~8)fJ .
nn
Solving this, we obtain optimum nn as
(3.1) n = K. s(l- B)
n r 8(1- s)E+s(1-B)
Using (3.1), we obtain
(3.2) X =L. B{B(1- S)E + s(1- B)}




B(1- S)8 + s(1- B) 1- z
With (2.1) and (3.1)·(3.3), we obtain the utility level Un.
EFFECT OF STRUCTURAL REGULATION IN A CLOSED ECONOMY
In the preceding section, we obtained the optimum outputs, the number of
companies, and the utility levels of structural regulation. We compare each
amount in this section.
Comparing (2.11)·(2.13) with (3.1)-(3.3), we obtain the following result. 1
~ = (1- s)& + s(1- B) > 1,
nm B(1- s)& + s(1- B)
Yn = (B{(l- s)& + s(1- B)}J' < I,
Ym B(1- S)8 + s(1- B)
X n = B(l- s)& + s(1- B) < 1 n X =n X
X
m
(1-s)&+s(1-B) 'm m n n'
( Je(l-S)+~(I-B)Un= 8'(1"') (1- s)&+ sO - 8) 8 > 1.Um B(1- S)E + s(1- B)
We get nn > nm , that is, the number of companies in the constrained
optimum is larger than that in the market equilibrium. This means the
government must promote companies to enter in the monopolistic competitive
sector, and must cover the deficits of each company. The government must
increase the number of varieties because the. utility function (2.1) is a love·of-
variety type.
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However at this time, the government must reduce the output of one
company. In the differentiated good sector, the production function is under
economies of scale. By reducing the output of one company, the merit of
economies of scale is lost. Therefore, the government reduces the output of the
homogeneous good and concentrates the endowment in the differentiated good
sector. Then nmXm= nn~ is realized.
As a result, the utility level of constrained optima is always higher than that
of the market equilibrium. This means that if two countries (ora country and
the rest of the world), which trade each other and have similar production
technology and consumption patterns, institute the same industrial policy, both
countries (or the world) increase their utility levels.
MARKET EQUILIBRIUM IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
In this section, we explain the open economy model of Lawrence=Spiller
(1983).
The utility functions in each country are
(5.1-1)
s
(5.1-2). u* =y*I-' (t XIi *8 + ~X2i *8 y,
where y is the consumption of the homogeneous good, xJi is the consumption
of one differentiated good in the home country, and * refers to the consumption
in the foreign country. The subscripts 1 and 2 refer to the production location of
the good: 1 is home production, while 2 is foreign production. nand n * are the
number of companies in the monopolistic competitive sector in home and foreign
country, respectively.
The output of one company in the monopolistic competitive sector, J0;, is
defined as
for j=1,2, i=l, "', n.
Y and y* are the outputs of homogeneous good in the home country and in
the foreign country, respectively. Their sum is the same as the sum of
consumption in both countries. This relation is represented as
127
(5.2) Y + y* = y + Y*.
The budget constraints in each country are
(5.3-1)
n n* n n
y+ L~iXli+LP2iX2i =Y +L~iXli +L~i*Xl/ ,







where Pji and !ji* are the price of the differentiated good in the home country
and in the foreign country, respectively.
Maximizing (5-1) yields the first-order condition:
(5.4-1)" Pji = ~ YXji8-1!(L.n x1i8+ fX2i8),
1 S i=l i=1
P * _ S * *8-1!(Ln *8 Ln* *8)-- --y X-- Xl- + X,- ,Jl 1 Jl 1 _I
- S i=l i=l
We assume that each company of the two countries has the same production
technology. This assumption implies symmetrical solutions of the output of
companies in the monopolistic competitive sector inside each country.
In an open economy, the prices of a differentiated good become the same in




1 S Xl *8-1
R --- y - -- y *----:'~--~




1 S X 2 *8-1~ =--Y 8 8 =-- Y *----:'(J------~1-S nxt + n * X 2 1-S nxt * +n * X2 *(J ,
where J: is the price of a home-made differentiated good and ~ the price of a
foreign-made differentiated good.
The production functions of the homogeneous good are
(5.6-1), (5.6-2) Y =K/:Ly l -&, y* =K y *& Ly *1-&.
w* Ly*= (l-&)Y*,
r* K * =8Y*.y
Therefore, the first-order conditions for profit maximization in the homogeneous
good industry are
(5.7-1), (5.7-2) wLy = (1- &)Y,
(5.8-1), (5.8-2) rKy =&Y,
The endowment constraints are
(5.9-1), (5.9-2) L = Ly + nf3(xt +Xl *), L* = Ly *+n * f3(X2+ X2*) ,
(5.10-1), (5.10.;2) K = Ky +ny, K*= Ky *+n *y.
The first-order conditions for profit maximization in the heterogeneous good
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industry are
(5.11-1), (5.11-2) J:B= w[J, P2B = w* [J .
The zero profit conditions in the heterogeneous good industry are
(5.12-1) ~ (Xl + Xl *) = rr + wfJ(XI + Xl *),
(5.12-2) P2 (x2 + x 2*) = r *r + w* [J(x2 + x 2*),
where Ky , Ly , r, and ware the capital input in the homogeneous industry,
the labor input in the homogeneous industry, the rental rate, and the wage rate
in the home country, respectively. * refers to. the foreign country.
We have supposed that each company of the two countries has the same
production technology. In an open economy, we also suppose that factor prices
are equalized between the two countries, that is, w = w* and r =r *.
Accordingly, we suppose that the prices of a home-made differentiated good and
that of a foreign-made differentiated good are equalized, that is, P = P * . Then,
the outputs of a company in the home country and in the foreign country become
equal.
At this time, taking y/x=y*/x*=(y+y*)/X into account, (5.5) is
I
expressed as
(5.13) . P = S Y + Y *
1-s (n+n*)X
Then, we obtain the output of each good in both countries by solving these
equations in the same way as the closed economy model.
Now, we introduce the following variables,
2K*/L*.
(5.14) a = K/L+ K */L * ' 0 ~ a ~ 2,
(5.15) A = ~(~* + ~*} A >0.
a is a measure of the capital-labor differential, and 2 is a measure of size.
When a>1, the foreign country is capital-abundant.
Thus, the factor endowments in the world are








The output of a company is
N = n + n* = K' . s(l -- B) .
r z
r (}zX=-·----
k' fJ (l-B)(l- z)
The output of the homogeneous good in the world is
y +y* =k" L'.(l~S{:JG=:f&·
Here, the shares of capital and labor in production are z and 1- z , so the
share of GNP of the home country in the world is
K L z l-z
1[1 =z· +(l-z)· = +----
K +K* L+L* l+alL 1+(2-a)1L
Then the consumption of a differentiated good in the home country is
(5.17) x - 1[ X - ZYB(_Z_.!+ IJ
- 1 - fJ(l- B)(l + aA)k 1- z 8 .
The consumption of a homogeneous good in the home country is
(5.18) y = 1[1 (Y + Y*) = k'S L· (l-s)(I-S{s(l- Z»)S(_z_.~+IJ.
'\ z(l - &") 1- z 8
Using these variables, we obtain the utility level of the home country U.
We can now calculate the consumption in the foreign country, x* and y*,
as x* =X - x and y* =y + Y * - y , and also obtain the utility level of the foreign
country U*.
STRUCTURAL REGULATION IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
In the fourth section, we showed that the utility level realized by structural
regulation is higher than that of the market equilibrium. Therefore, if two
countries engage in the same industrial policy, both countries increase their
utility levels.
In actuality, it is unrealistic to suppose that two countries trading with each
other (or~ all countries trading with one another) will cooperate on the same
industrial policy. Rather we should attend to the industrial policy of one country
in an open economy. In fact, it is often observed that a country undertakes
structural regulation by some barriers or regulations in an open economy.
In this section, we analyze the situation when only one country enacts
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structural regulation in an open economy.
In this situation, factor prices are not equalized between the two countries.
Accordingly, the price of a home-made differentiated good and a foreign-made
differentiated good are not equalized, that is, p.."* P2. Furthermore, the
condition of zero profit in the heterogeneous good industry in the home country
is not realized, but this condition is realized in the foreign country.
K, L, K*, L*, r, /3, £, sand B are constants. When n is given, Xl' X2 ,
y, Xl *, X2 *, Y *, n * and other variables are solutions to the simultaneous
equation (5.2), (5.3), (5.5)-(5.11) and (5.12-2). However, we cannot solve this
simultaneous equation. By simulating different values for the parameters
(constants and n), we obtain a solution for this simultaneous equation.
When we solve this simultaneous equation, the home country must find the
optimum number of companies to maximize the utility level of the home country.
The number, n, is the solution to the calculation
S
max U=yl-S(nx/J +n* X/})B
n
s. t. (5.2), (5.3), (5.5)-(5.11) and (5.12-2).
Thus, we obtain the optimum value of n.
At the same time, we also obtain the utility levels of the home country and
the foreign country.
EFFECT OF STRUCTURAL REGULATION IN AN OPEN ECONOMY
In the preceding section, we obtained the optimum outputs, the number of
companies, and the utility levels of structural regulation. In this section, we
compare and then analyze the ·effect of structural regulation on the home
country and the foreign country.
Our analysis shows that structural regulation in the home country, which
increases the.utility level of the home country, may also increase the utility
level of the foreign country. This result is interesting.
For example, we have a result of structural regulation in Table 1 where
K=K*=400, L=L*=500, r=4, /3=3, £=0.3, s=0.5, B=0.4.
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Table 1: Number of companies in foreign country, consumption, prices, and
utility levels in both countries (compared with market equilibrium) when
home country undertakes structural regulation on K = K *=400, L = L *=500,
r=4, [3=3, 8=0.3, s=0.5, 8=0.4.
n n* Xl X* P X2 X * p* y y* U u* noteI 2
63 65.52 .995 .995 1.003 1.005 1.005 .997 1.0003 10003. .9998 .9998
64 64.56 .999 .999 1.001 1.001 1.001 .999 1.0001 1.0001 .9999 .9999
64.29 64.29 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1




72 56.61 1.029 1.029 .980 .968 .969 1.016 .9977 .9982 1.00065 1.0012
73 55.58 1.033 1.034 .977 .964 .965 1.018 .9973 .9980 1.00066 1.0013 U max




81 46.99 1.067 1.070 .954 .930 .933 1.036 .9939 .9964 1.0001 1.0026
82 45.87 1.072 1.075 .951 .926 .929 1.038 .9934 .9962 .9999 1.0028
83 44.74 1.077 1.080 .948 .922 .925 1.041 .9928 .9960 .9997 1.0029
Table 1 shows a case in which structural regulation increases the utility
level of the foreign country. In the market equilibrium, the number of
companies in the home country is 64.29. As the home country increases this
number, the utility level of both countries increase. When the home country
regulates the number as 73, the utility level of the home country is maximized,
so the optimum n is 73. When the home country increases the number over 73,
the utility level of the home country decreases. However the utility level of the
foreign country continues to increase. On the contrary, when the home country
reduces the number of companies to under 64.29, the utility levels of both
countries decrease.
Table 1 also shows interesting changes in each amount. As stated in the
fourth section,' structural regulation that increases the number of companies
reduces the output of a company in the closed economy. However, as shown in
Table 1, as the home country·increases the number of companies in the home
country, the consumption of a home-made differentiated good, Xl and XI *,
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increases. Its price then becomes cheaper due to economies of scale. At the same
time, this policy reduces the consumption of a foreign-made differentiated good,
X 2 and X2 *.
We find that if & +8 < 1 , this strange phenomenon happens.2 On the
contrary, if & + () > 1, structural regulation that increases the number of
companies in the home country reduces XI and XI *, and increases X 2 and X 2 *.
From other simulations, we obtain the result where if K/L = K */L * is
realized, structural regulation that increases the number of companies in the
home country increases the utility levels of both countries on any value of each
constant.3 This means that au > 0 and au * > 0 is locally realized·at the point
an an
of the market equilibrium.4 Then we obtain proposition I.
PROPOSITION I. If the factor endowment ratios of two countries are the same,
structural regulation in the home country increases the utility levels of both
countries.
However, if the factor endowment ratio of two countries is not the same,
structural regulation that increases the utility level of the home country does
not always increase the utility levels of the foreign country.
To analyze this, we use the following variables,
2K*/L*(5.14) a = K/L +K */L * ' o:s; a:S; 2,
(5.15) 4 = ~(i* + LL*} 4 >0.
From other simulations, we find the relation between a and 2 - a. If
au >0 and au* >0 is realized on a=a', /1,=..1,', &=&', 5=S' and (J=8', then
an an
au au*
->0 and -->0 on a=2-a', /1,=A', &=&', s=s' and 8=8'. In this case,
an an
a and 2 - a are symmetrical.
H ·f au 0 d au*0 . 1· d ' '1 '1 ,owever,l - < an-- > IS rea Ize on a=a, /l.=/l., &=&', S=5'
an an
au au*
and 8=8', then ->0 and --<0 on a=2-a',/1,=/1,', &=&', s=s' and
an an
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Figure 1: Effect of structural regulation in an open economy on A =1, S =0.5 ..
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au au* au au* au· au*0:-->0 and -->0 A:-<Oand --->0 .:-->0 and ---<0
an an' an an' an an
Declining lines express 8 +B=1. When it is realized, there is no factor price
equalization range, so we eliminate this case.
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B=8'. In this case, a and 2 - a are asymmetrical.5




PROPOSITION 2. If structural regulation in the home country increases the
utility levels of both countries on some values of a, A, 8, sand B, a and
2 - a have a symmetrical effect.
If structural regulation in the home country cannot increase the utility
levels of both countries on some values of a, A, 8, sand B, a and 2 - a
have an asymmetrical effect.
For size of a, we examine Figure 1.
Figure 1 shows how the capital-labor differential has an impact on
structural regulation. As a result, we obtain the tendency where as a grows
au au* .from 1, and the range of - > 0 and -- > 0 shrInks. Furthermore, from other
an an
simulations, we find that this tendency is realized on any value of A and s.
PROPOSITION 3. The larger differential two countries have in the factor
endowment ratio, the smaller range in which structural regulation increases
the utility levels of both countries.
These propositions mean that if two countries (or a country and the rest of
the world) have similar factor endowment ratio, structural regulation, which
increases the utility level of the home country,have a positive effect on the
foreign country (or all the world).
CONCLUSION
This paper has described a two-country, two-good, two-factor general
equilibrium model, analyzed the effect of structural regulation, and obtained
some results.
First, if two countries, which trade each other and have similar production
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technology and consumption patterns, enact the same industrial policy, both
countries increase their utility levels.
Second, if two countries have similar factor endowment ratios, the policy in a
country increases the utility levels of the both countries. Furthermore, if the
factor endowment ratios of the· two countries are the same, the policy always
increases the utility levels of the both countries.
Mter all, if two countries have similar property in technology, consumption
pattern and factor endowment ratio, structural regulation, whether done by one
country or the two countries together, benefits both the home country and the
foreign country.
We cannot clarify the reason for the second result and require further
research to uncover this reason. However, this result implies a new direction in
an industrial policy, which is not the same as simple liberalization or
protection.
NOTES
1. We simulate different values for the parameters in their respective range
to analyze the value of Un IUm.
2. E +() < 1 means the differentiated good industry is capital-intensive.
3. Parameters are given values in their respective range.
4. The word locally means, as we have seen in Table 1, that these signs may
change when n is significantly different from the value of the market
equilibrium.
5. aU18n<0 and 8U*18n>0 may be realized if a>1 and 8+0>1, or a<1 and
8+.8<1.
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